FIRST DIVISION
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EQUI-ASIA
PLACEMENT, INC.,
Petitioner, - versus - DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) represented by the HON. DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), represented by HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA,
Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 152214 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari of
the Decision dated
The Court of Appeals summarized the
facts of this case in this wise:
On
“VERY URGENT, POLO
has recently received a report that OFW Manny dela
Rosa RAZON, an undocumented worker, died last Saturday, 16 September, from an
apparent pancreatic attack or ‘bangungot.’
According to the verbal reports of Moises and Ronald Recarde,
Manny’s co-workers, he was found already lifeless inside their quarters at
around
Per information gathered, the deceased is single, 29 years old, from Bukal, Lemery, Batangas. His next-of-kins are Mrs. Rowena Razon (Auntie) and Mr. Razon (Uncle) with telephone number (043)411-2308.
POLO is awaiting signed statements from the aforementioned workers who promised to send it by fax this afternoon.
We are also coordinating with the deceased’s employer for documentation requirements and financial assistance for the repatriation of the remains.
We will highly appreciate if Home Office could advise the next-of-kins of the urgent need to issue a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to facilitate the repatriation requirements of the subject.
In anticipation of the next-of-kins’ likely move to seek financial assistance from OWWA for the repatriation of their loved [one], please be advised in advance that we will need about US$4,000.00 to repatriate the cadaver (to include hospital and morgue costs) to Manila. xxx”
In turn, the OWWA, through Atty. Cesar L. Chavez, indorsed the matter, for appropriate action, to Director R. Casco of the Welfare Employment Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (WEO-POEA).
Upon
verification by the WEO-POEA on its data base, it was discovered that Manny Razon was recruited and deployed by petitioner Equi-Asia Placement, Inc., and was sent to South Korea on
April 3, 2000 to work-train at Yeongjin Machinery,
Inc. Thereupon, POEA addressed the herein
first assailed telegram-directive dated
“PLEASE PROVIDE PTA
[Prepaid Ticket Advice] FOR THE REPATRIATION OF REMAINS AND BELONGINGS OF OFW
MANNY DELA ROSA RAZON AS PER REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE
Responding thereto, petitioner, thru
its President Daniel Morga, Jr., faxed on
“In connection with your telegram, dated 09/22/2000, requiring us to report the circumstances surrounding the death of OFW MANNY DELA ROSA RAZON in Korea and requesting us to issue a PTA, etc., for the repatriation of the remains of said OFW, this is to report to your good office the following:
1. The
deceased was deployed by our agency on
2. He
violated his employment/training/dispatching contracts on
3. He allegedly died of ‘bangungot’ thereafter;
In view thereof, we cannot heed your requests as embodied in your telegram. However, his relatives can avail of the benefits provided for by OWWA in cases involving undocumented/illegal Filipino workers abroad.
Trusting for your kind understanding”
On
the same date –
“We
have received a copy of your fax message dated
On
“In connection with your fax letter dated September 26, 2000, re: the repatriation of the remains of the deceased, ex-trainee (OFW) MANNY DELA ROSA RAZON, please be informed that the provisions of Section 53 as well as, and in relation to, Section 55 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 on the matters covering the following:
1. The responsibility of the agency to advance the cost of plane fare without prior determination of the cause of the deceased worker’s termination.
2. The recovery of the same costs from the estate of the dead worker before the NLRC.
3. The action to be imposed by POEA for non-compliance therewith within 48 hours are violative of due process and/or the principle on due delegation of power.
This is so because Sec. 15 of R.A. 8042 clearly contemplates prior notice and hearing before responsibility thereunder could be established against the agency that sets up the defense of sole fault – in avoidance of said responsibility -. Besides, the sections in question unduly grant the powers to require advance payment of the plane fare, to impose the corresponding penalty of suspension in case of non-compliance therewith, within 48 hours and to recover said advance payment from the dead worker’s estate upon the return of his remains to the country before the NLRC, when the law itself does not expressly provide for the grant of such powers.
x x x x x x x x x.
Please provide us immediately with the death certificate/post mortem report/police report pertinent to above as proof of death and cause thereof.”
Nonetheless, and apprehensive of the adverse repercussions which may ensue on account of its non-compliance with the directive, petitioner, on September 29, 2000, advanced under protest the costs for the repatriation of the remains of the late Manny dela Rosa Razon.
Thereafter, petitioner went to this Court via the instant petition for certiorari, posing, for Our consideration, the sole issue of –
“WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 52, 53, 54 AND 55 OF THE OMNIBUS RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995 (R.A. 8042), ISSUED BY DFA AND POEA, WHICH POEA SUMMARILY ORDERED THE HEREIN PETITIONER TO COMPLY VIZ-A-VIZ THE PAYMENT IN ADVANCE OF THE EXPENSES FOR THE REPATRIATION OF THE REMAINS OF A DECEASED WORKER-TRAINEE WHO, AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH, HAS NO EXISTING EMPLOYMENT (DISPATCHING) CONTRACT WITH EITHER SAID PETITIONER OR HIS FOREIGN PRINCIPAL AND NO VALID VISA OR IS NOT WORKING WITH THE FOREIGN PRINCIPAL TO WHICH PETITIONER DEPLOYED HIM, IS ILLEGAL AND/OR VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS SUCH THAT POEA ACTED WITHOUT [OR IN] EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND/OR IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING SAID ORDER TO PAY SAID EXPENSES.”[2]
On
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DENIED and is accordingly DISMISSED.[3]
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals stated
that petitioner was mainly accusing the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) of grave abuse of discretion when it ordered petitioner
to pay, in advance, the costs for the repatriation of the remains of the
deceased Manny dela Rosa Razon.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the
POEA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as its directives to
petitioner were issued pursuant to existing laws and regulations.[4] It likewise held that a petition for certiorari, which was the remedy availed
of by petitioner, is not the proper remedy as the same is only available when
“there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.”[5] Section 62 of the Omnibus Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
or Republic Act 8042 (“Omnibus Rules”) states that “the Labor Arbiters of NLRC
shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all
claims arising out of employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, subject to the rules
and procedures of the NLRC.” There is,
therefore, an adequate remedy available to petitioner.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals declared
that it could not strike down as unconstitutional Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of
the Omnibus Rules as the unconstitutionality of a statute or rules may not be
passed upon unless the issue is directly raised in an appropriate proceeding.[6]
In the present recourse, petitioner
submits the following issues for our consideration:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in the appreciation of the issue as it mistakenly considered, in dismissing the petition before it, that petitioner is contesting the compliance and conformity of the POEA directives with Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations implementing in particular Section 15 of RA 8042;
2. The Court of Appeals, in dismissing the petition, again erred in ruling that constitutional questions cannot be passed upon and adjudged in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
3. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that, under the facts of the case that gave rise to the petition before it, the same sections of the said rules and regulations are illegal, invalid and/or violative of the right of petitioner to due process of law and, therefore, the POEA directives issued pursuant thereto constitute acts committed without, or in excess of, jurisdiction and/or in grave abuse of discretion.[7]
In
Our Resolution of
At
the center of this petition are the following provisions of the omnibus rules:
Section 52. Primary Responsibility for Repatriation. – The repatriation of the worker, or his/her remains, and the transport of his/her personal effects shall be the primary responsibility of the principal or agency which recruited or deployed him/her abroad. All costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal or the agency concerned.
Section 53. Repatriation of Workers. – The primary responsibility to repatriate entails the obligation on the part of principal or agency to advance the cost of plane fare and to immediately repatriate the worker should the need for it arise, without a prior determination of the cause of the termination of the worker’s employment. However, after the worker has returned to the country, the principal or agency may recover the cost of repatriation from the worker if the termination of employment was due solely to his/her fault.
Every contract for overseas employment shall provide for the primary responsibility of agency to advance the cost of plane fare, and the obligation of the worker to refund the cost thereof in case his/her fault is determined by the Labor Arbiter.
Section 54. Repatriation
Procedure. – When a need for repatriation arises and the foreign employer
fails to provide for it cost, the responsible personnel at site shall
simultaneously notify OWWA and the POEA of such need. The POEA shall notify the agency concerned of
the need for repatriation. The agency
shall provide the plane ticket or the prepaid ticket advice (PTA) to the
Section 55. Action on Non-Compliance. – If the employment agency fails to provide the ticket or PTA within 48 hours from receipt of the notice, the POEA shall suspend the license of the agency or impose such sanctions as it may deem necessary. Upon notice from the POEA, OWWA shall advance the costs of repatriation with recourse to the agency or principal. The administrative sanction shall not be lifted until the agency reimburses the OWWA of the cost of repatriation with legal interest.
Said provisions, on the other hand, are
supposed to implement Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042[9]
which provides:
SEC. 15. Repatriation of Workers; Emergency Repatriation Fund. – The repatriation of the worker and the transport of his personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which, recruited or deployed the worker overseas. All costs attendant to repatriation shall be borne by or charged to the agency concerned and/or its principal. Likewise, the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings of a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or the local agency. However, in cases where the termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the worker, the principal/employer or agency shall not in any manner be responsible for the repatriation of the former and/or his belongings.
Petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals misappreciated the issue it presented in its
petition for certiorari when, instead
of resolving whether Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the Omnibus Rules are
illegal and violative of due process, it merely
confined itself to the question of whether or not the POEA committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing its directives of 22 September 2000 and 27
September 2000.
Petitioner also contends that,
contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, a special civil action for certiorari is the appropriate remedy to
raise constitutional issues.
Also,
petitioner insists that the subject portions of the omnibus rules are invalid on
the ground that Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 does not impose on a
recruitment agency the primary responsibility for the repatriation of a
deceased Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW), while Section 52 of the Omnibus Rules
unduly imposes such burden on a placement agency.
Moreover,
petitioner argues that the word “likewise” at the start of the third sentence
of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 is used merely as a connective word
indicating the similarity between a recruitment agency’s financial obligation
in the repatriation of living and a deceased OFW. It does not, however, necessarily make a
placement agency primarily responsible for the repatriation of a deceased OFW
unlike in the case of an OFW who is alive.
As for
Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules, petitioner submits that the same is invalid as
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 clearly states that a placement agency
shall not in any manner be responsible for the repatriation of the deceased OFW
and his or her belongings should the termination of the OFW’s
employment be due to his or her fault.
However, as Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules stipulates that a placement
agency or principal shall bear the primary responsibility of repatriating an
OFW and of advancing the payment for his or her plane fare, the omibus rules, as far as this section is concerned, is an
invalid exercise of legislative power by an administrative agency.
In
addition, petitioner claims Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules violates the due
process clause of the constitution as it deprives the deploying agency of the
right to prior notice and hearing through which it can prove that it should not
bear the burden of repatriating an OFW.
Finally,
petitioner points out that it should be the Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration which should advance the costs of repatriation of the deceased Razon with the resources coming out of the emergency
repatriation fund of said agency.
The
Solicitor General for its part counters that Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the
Omnibus Rules are valid quasi-legislative acts of respondents Department of
Foreign Affairs and Department of Labor and Employment.[10] Because of this, the requirements of prior
notice and hearing are not essential.
Besides, there are cases where even in the exercise of quasi-judicial
power, administrative agencies are allowed, sans prior notice and hearing, to
effectuate measures affecting private property, such as:
1) [F]or the summary abatement of nuisance per se which affects the immediate
safety of persons and property, or 2) in
summary proceedings of distraint and levy upon the
property of delinquent taxpayers in the collection of internal revenue taxes,
fees or charges or any increment thereto, or 3)
in the preventive suspension of a public officer pending investigation.
x x x.[11]
The Solicitor General also adds that
since petitioner is engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers for work
abroad, the nature of its business calls for the exercise of the state’s police
power in order to safeguard the rights and welfare of the Filipino
laborers. One such measure is the
primary responsibility imposed upon placement agencies with regard to the
repatriation of an OFW or of his remains.
The Solicitor General also argues that
the wording of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 leaves no doubt that a
recruitment agency shall bear the primary responsibility for the repatriation
of an OFW whether the latter is dead or alive.
Lastly, the Solicitor General insists
that actions assailing the validity of implementing rules and regulations are
within the original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.
We shall first address the procedural
question involved in the present petition.
There is no denying that regular
courts have jurisdiction over cases involving the validity or constitutionality
of a rule or regulation issued by administrative agencies. Such jurisdiction, however, is not limited to
the Court of Appeals or to this Court alone for even the regional trial courts
can take cognizance of actions assailing a specific rule or set of rules
promulgated by administrative bodies.
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power
to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including
the regional trial courts.[12]
Section 1,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
From this, it is clear that in order
for a petition for certiorari to
prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1)
the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
It bears emphasizing that
administrative bodies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative
and the quasi-judicial.[13] In Abella, Jr. v. Civil
Service Commission,[14]
we discussed the nature of these powers to be –
In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the rights of persons before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law. The determination of facts and the applicable law, as basis for official action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the performance of this function. On these considerations, it is elementary that due process requirements, as enumerated in Ang Tibay, must be observed. These requirements include prior notice and hearing.
On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. Prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.
In this case, petitioner assails certain
provisions of the Omnibus Rules. However, these rules were clearly promulgated
by respondents Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of Labor and
Employment in the exercise of their quasi-legislative powers or the authority
to promulgate rules and regulations.
Because of this, petitioner was, thus, mistaken in availing himself of
the remedy of an original action for certiorari
as obviously, only judicial or quasi-judicial acts are proper subjects
thereof. If only for these, the petition
deserves outright dismissal. Be that as it may, we shall proceed to resolve the
substantive issues raised in this petition for review in order to finally
remove the doubt over the validity of Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the
Omnibus Rules.
It is now well-settled that delegation
of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed
in the face of increasing complexity of modern life. Given the volume and variety of interactions
involving the members of today’s society, it is doubtful if the legislature can
promulgate laws dealing with the minutiae aspects of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative
bodies, as the principal agencies tasked to execute laws with respect to their
specialized fields, the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given statute and effectuate its policies.[15] All that is required for the valid exercise
of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation must be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law; and that the regulation be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law.[16] Under the first test or the so-called
completeness test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only
thing he will have to do is to enforce it.[17] The second test or the sufficient standard
test, mandates that there should be adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.[18]
We resolve that the questioned
provisions of the Omnibus Rules meet these requirements.
Basically, petitioner is impugning the
subject provisions of the Omnibus Rules for allegedly expanding the scope of
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 by: first,
imposing upon it the primary obligation to repatriate the remains of the
deceased Razon including the duty to advance the cost
of the plane fare for the transport of Razon’s
remains; and second, by ordering it
to do so without prior determination of the existence of employer-employee
relationship between itself and Razon.
Petitioner’s argument that Section 15
does not provide that it shall be primarily responsible for the repatriation of
a deceased OFW is specious and plain nitpicking. While Republic Act No. 8042 does not
expressly state that petitioner shall be primarily obligated to transport back
here to the Philippines the remains of the deceased Razon,
nevertheless, such duty is imposed upon him as the statute clearly dictates
that “the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings of a
deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or
the local agency.” The mandatory nature
of said obligation is characterized by the legislature’s use of the word
“shall.” That the concerned government
agencies opted to demand the performance of said responsibility solely upon
petitioner does not make said directives invalid as the law plainly obliges a
local placement agency such as herein petitioner to bear the burden of
repatriating the remains of a deceased OFW with or without recourse to the
principal abroad. In this regard, we see
no reason to invalidate Section 52 of the omnibus rules as Republic Act No.
8042 itself permits the situation wherein a local recruitment agency can be
held exclusively responsible for the repatriation of a deceased OFW.
Nor do we see any reason to stamp
Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules as invalid for allegedly contravening Section
15 of the law which states that a placement agency shall not be responsible for
a worker’s repatriation should the termination of the employer-employee
relationship be due to the fault of the OFW.
To our mind, the statute merely states the general principle that in
case the severance of the employment was because of the OFW’s
own undoing, it is only fair that he or she should shoulder the costs of his or
her homecoming. Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 8042, however, certainly does not preclude a placement agency from
establishing the circumstances surrounding an OFW’s
dismissal from service in an appropriate proceeding. As such determination would most likely take
some time, it is only proper that an OFW be brought back here in our country at
the soonest possible time lest he remains stranded in a foreign land during the
whole time that recruitment agency contests its liability for
repatriation. As aptly pointed out by
the Solicitor General –
Such a situation is unacceptable.
24. This is the same reason why repatriation is made by law an obligation of the agency and/or its principal without the need of first determining the cause of the termination of the worker’s employment. Repatriation is in effect an unconditional responsibility of the agency and/or its principal that cannot be delayed by an investigation of why the worker was terminated from employment. To be left stranded in a foreign land without the financial means to return home and being at the mercy of unscrupulous individuals is a violation of the OFW’s dignity and his human rights. These are the same rights R.A. No. 8042 seeks to protect.[19]
As for the sufficiency of standard
test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the
following: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience and
welfare,” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”[20]
In this
case, we hold that the legislature’s pronouncements that Republic Act No. 8042
was enacted with the thought of upholding the dignity of the Filipinos may they
be here or abroad and that the State shall at all times afford full protection
to labor, both here and abroad, meet the requirement and provide enough
guidance for the formulation of the omnibus rules.
WHEREFORE, the
Petition for Review is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals’ Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justices Hilarion L. Aquino and Edgardo P. Cruz, concurring; rollo, pp. 44-55.
[2] Rollo, pp. 45-50.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] AN ACT TO INSTITUTE THE POLICIES OF OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT AND ESTABLISH A HIGHER STANDARD OF PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE WELFARE OF MIGRANT WORKERS, THEIR FAMILIES AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS IN DISTRESS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
[10] Signed by Secretary Domingo L. Siazon, Jr. for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing for the Department of Labor and Employment.
[11] Rollo, p. 294.
[12] Smart
Communications, Inc. (SMART) v. National Telecommunications Commission (NTC),
G.R. No. 151908,
[13] Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Agency, G.R. No.
L-76633,
[14] G.R. No. 152574,
[15] Beltran
v. Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 133640,
[16] The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v. Philippine Overseas Employment Agency, 313 Phil. 592, 606 (1995).
[17] Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Agency, supra note 13 at 543.
[18]
[19] Rollo, p. 300.
[20] Supra note 13 at 537.